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Abstract— Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems face the absence of a protection technique that can beat 
different types of intrusions and protect the data from disclosure 
while handling this data using other applications, specifically 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The SCADA system can 
manage the critical infrastructure of industrial control 
environments. Protecting sensitive information is a difficult task 
to achieve in reality with the connection of physical and digital 
systems. Hence, privacy preservation techniques have become 
effective in order to protect sensitive/private information and to 
detect malicious activities, but they are not accurate in terms of 
error detection, sensitivity percentage of data disclosure.  In this 
paper, we propose a new Privacy Preservation Intrusion Detection 
(PPID) technique based on the correlation coefficient and 
Expectation Maximisation (EM) clustering mechanisms for 
selecting important portions of data and recognizing intrusive 
events. This technique is evaluated on the power system datasets 
for multiclass attacks to measure its reliability for detecting 
suspicious activities. The experimental results outperform three 
techniques in the above terms, showing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the proposed technique to be utilized for current 
SCADA systems. 
  
Keywords- SCADA systems, Privacy preservation technique, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
      
     Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems 
that operate in critical infrastructure are progressively executed 
with Internet-based protocols and devices for remote control. 
The involved embedded components’ nature and legacy factors 
add non-trivial and novel security approaches efficiently [1]. In 
a SCADA system, it is significant that a protection mechanism 
is embedded to define various types of intrusive activities and 
protecting sensitive information from disclosure. It monitors 
and controls critical industrial infrastructure utilities, such as 
gas, electricity, waste, traffic, water, and railway [1] [2].  
 
   The augmented complexity and connectivity of SCADA 
systems face a large number of cyber security vulnerabilities 
[2]. In addition, they include embedded devices that allow only 
limited protection against current sophisticated strategies of 
intrusive activities, resulting in exposing the principles of 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). Practically, 
malicious or unauthorized access to external sources, using the 
TCP/IP model, can threaten SCADA systems by misusing 
communication faults/problems to launch sophisticated attacks 
which lead to catastrophic failure, denial of service, 
compromising the safety and stability of power system 
operations [3]. 
 
  To defend against threats to a SCADA system and protecting 
its shared data, an IDS is defined as a technique for monitoring 
host or network activities to detect possible threats that face 
them, has become a powerful solution. Data mining and 
machine learning algorithms are widely used for establishing an 
effective IDS [4] because of their capability to handle a large 
volume of historical data, as it is hard for people to deduce 
primary traffic patterns in such SCADA’s data.  However, the 
scarcity of SCADA data is considered as one of the main issues 
for establishing an efficient IDS for SCADA systems. The 
privacy preservation of these data requires a new methodology 
for keeping these data without disclosure. So, it is widely 
realised nowadays that SCADA data privacy and 
confidentiality are greatly becoming a key aspect of data 
sharing and integration [3] [5].  
 
   The aim of designing an intelligent IDS for SCADA systems 
without revealing their data has become one of the big issues in 
this field due to several reasons [1][2][3]. First and foremost, 
the use of traditional machine learning and data mining 
mechanisms for discovering intrusive activities requires a large 
amount of SCADA data to be correctly learned and validated. 
This exposes the principles of privacy and confidentiality [2]. 
If the mechanisms are learned using a small amount of SCADA 
information, they will poorly detect those malicious activities. 
Secondly, selecting the important SCADA’s information that 
helps these mechanisms has become an arduous task because 
the information of SCADA should be carefully analysed to 
avoid sensitive information from the processing by the IDS 
techniques. Finally, the way of capturing information from 
different incompatible layers and protocols of current SCADA 
systems demands efficient tools and mechanisms to be 
successfully handled at a real time monitoring and detection [1] 
[2].  In the literature, privacy preservation data mining 
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techniques have emerged in order to protect sensitive 
information [1] [3] [4], but the above limitations for SCADA 
data are still an active area of research.  
 
   This paper addresses the above limitations by applying the 
privacy preservation concept for SCADA systems. A new 
privacy preservation Intrusion Detection (PPID) technique is 
proposed using the correlation coefficient technique for 
selecting the important information without exposing sensitive 
information of SCADA data. This uses EM clustering algorithm 
for identifying intrusive observations of SCADA instances. 
This technique is evaluated on power system datasets [21] for 
multiclass attacks. The experimental results outperform three 
techniques in the above terms, showing the efficiency of it to be 
utilised for current SCADA systems. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. IDS and its relation to SCADA systems  
  
    Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) for SCADA systems 
have become an active domain of research [2][3][4][5]. IDSs 
are classified into two types: a host-based IDS monitors the 
events of a host by collecting information about activities which 
occur in a computer system, while a network-based IDS 
monitors network traffic to identify remote attacks that take 
place across that network. IDS methods are categorized into 
two types: Misuse-based and Anomaly-based. A misuse-based 
IDS monitors host or network data audits to compare observed 
behaviours with those on an identified blacklist. Although it 
offers relatively high detection rates (DRs) and low false 
positive rates (FPRs), it cannot identify new attacks [3] [4]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Architecture of typical network IDS [6] 
 
  A typical network IDS comprises of four components, namely 
a packet decoder, a pre-processor, a decision engine sensor and 
a defence response/alert module [6], as shown in Figure 1 and 
described as follows.   
 
 The packet decoder acquires portions of raw network 
traffic using audit data collection tools.   
 The pre-processor captures a set of features from the raw 
audit data, used later in the decision engine sensor.  
 The Decision Engine (DE) sensor receives the proposed 
features by the processor and builds a model that 
distinguishes attack observations from normal ones.  If 
an attack is detected, the DE requests the defence 
response to raising an alert.  
 The defence response is the process of raising alerts 
requested by the DE.  
 
   Several IDS methods have been proposed for SCADA 
systems. These are classified into supervised and unsupervised 
techniques [2] [7] [8]. The supervised methods, such as SVM 
[8] and Naive Bayes [9], include two main steps. Firstly, the 
learning step (where classification algorithms aim to analyse 
the supervised training data and build an inferred model). 
Secondly, the classification step (where the established model 
can be utilised to distinguish, detect, and classify malicious and 
infected data and potential cyber attacks in the future traffic 
streams). However, one of the major problems with all the 
supervised techniques is that the step of learning process needs 
a large size of training observations, which lead to establishing 
an effective generalised model [2].  
 
   It is important to note that the training data should be labelled 
in advance, which is time-consuming and requires previous 
knowledge. These Clustering [10] and SOFM–PCA [11] 
approaches provide some practical advantages over supervised 
techniques, which can use only unlabelled data. Unsupervised 
techniques attempt to create clusters in unlabelled traffic data 
and allocate any future traffic flow to either normal or attack 
category, according to the nearest cluster. Empirical evaluations 
demonstrate the higher-purity clusters, found by unsupervised 
techniques, and detect traffic flows from previously unknown 
types of applications. However, the unsupervised techniques 
have a crucial problem in mapping a great number of clusters 
to real traffic varieties, but they can detect existing and new 
attacks without labelling processing which is difficult in real 
time [2] [10] [11]. 
B. Privacy Preservation Techniques for sensitive data 
  
    Privacy Preservation techniques have emerged as a new 
direction of research by Aggarwal et al. in 2008 [12] in order to 
protect retrieving private/sensitive information. The target of 
these techniques is to considerably reduce unauthorised 
accessing of sensitive information while running any normal 
technique to do a particular task, such as IDS, for discovering 
useful knowledge. Simultaneously, attackers try to retrieve that 
information that can be executed by normal techniques, 
breaching the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) 
of systems. Privacy-preserving mechanisms generally modify 
the integrity of data to prevent normal techniques from the same 
knowledge of the altered data as completely and correctly 
similar to the original data [14]. 
   
    Numerous privacy-preserving methods for various scenarios 
of data have been proposed in the past years [2] [13]. The 
privacy-preserving methods, which modify or transform data to 
preserve privacy without compromising security, have been 
roughly classified into three classes, data generalisation 
methods, data transformation methods and data aggregation 
methods.  
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Firstly, in data generalisation methods, the core process is 
developed based on mapping sensitive attributes to more 
generalised values. Secondly, in transformation methods, the 
confidentiality of the data is preserved by transforming the 
original data into new values, with some random multiplication 
or by applying projection to the original data, resulting in lower 
dimensional random space. Finally, in data aggregation 
methods, the original data is partitioned into a group of small 
size, and then replaces the private values in each group with the 
group average. These methods still face the problem of 
handling different data types effectively [2] [13] and the 
integration with the IDS method which detects attacks. 
However, these methods face the challenge of using them for 
IDS as they provide high false alarm rate of detection, as well 
as the difficulty of using in SCADA systems that have several 
layers of data capturing with the linking with the internet 
services, as discussed below.  
C. SCADA systems 
     SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) is 
defined as the business automation control system central to 
many modern industries, including, oil, energy, gas, power, 
transportation and water [2]. Both public-sector providers and 
private enterprises use SCADA systems, and they can work 
well in various types of companies because they have the ability 
to extend from simple configurations to huge, complicated 
projects. SCADA systems organize manifold software and 
hardware components, which allow industrial institutions to 
gather, monitor, and process data, and also, cooperate with 
control technologies that are connected over Human Machine 
Interface (HMI) software and record events into a log file 
[4][15]. 
     Information of SCADA systems is collected from sensors or 
other manual inputs, and then sent to programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs) or remote terminal units (RTUs), from 
which this information is sent to the computers with SCADA 
software. Current SCADA systems have Ethernet connectivity 
to enable connecting with the functionalities of networking. 
Standard protocols include IEC 60870-5-101/104, IEC 
61850 and DNP3. These protocols are standardised to operate 
over the TCP/IP model. Modbus TCP Protocol is commonly 
supported in devices with Ethernet Connectivity [16]. The main 
function of SCADA software is to analyse and display the data 
to help operators and other employees to decrease waste and 
improve efficiency in the manufacturing procedure, as shown 
in Figure 2 [5][15]. 
    Some recent studies have focused on designing IDS for 
SCADA systems, and these studies show the challenges of 
designing an effective IDS–based SCADA system without 
disclosing their shared data. Classic encryption techniques, 
comprising RSA and AES, are not appropriate because we 
cannot use the encrypted data for analysing this data [17]. 
Encryption techniques are still the practical solution to prevent 
disclosing data, during transactions to that data, such as 
analysis, logging in databases and detection purposes, however, 
it has to be decrypted first. Meanwhile, processing any of those 
transactions could be intrusive actions happen; hence it is still a 
controversial area of research to find methods that provide 
privacy-preservation for SCADA data [1].  
 
 
Figure 2. Basic architecture of SCADA systems [9] 
 
I. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
  This section describes the proposed methodology for building 
an effective privacy preservation intrusion detection technique 
for SCADA systems.  
A. Correlation coefficient for selecting important information  
In this subsection, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient (PCC)   
technique is used in order to select the important information of 
SCADA systems, which is considered as one of the simplest 
linear correlation techniques for approximating the correlation 
scores of features [18], with that of two features ( 𝑓1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓2)  
𝑃𝐶𝐶( 𝑓1,  𝑓2) =
𝑐𝑜𝑣( 𝑓1, 𝑓2)
𝜎 𝑓1 .𝜎 𝑓2
       
           
     =  
∑ (𝑥𝑖−𝑀𝑓1)(𝑦𝑖−𝑀𝑓2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
√∑ (𝑥𝑖−𝑀𝑓1)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 .√∑ (𝑦𝑖−𝑀𝑓2)
2𝑁
𝑖=1
       (1) 
 
where 𝑐𝑜𝑣 and 𝜎 are the covariance and the standard deviation 
of these features, respectively, and  𝑀𝑓1 =
1
𝑁⁄ ∑ 𝑥𝑖  and  𝑀𝑓2 = 𝑁 ∑ 𝑦𝑖  
𝑛
𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 are the means of  f1 and f2, 
respectively. 
 
   The result attained from Equation (1) has to be in a specific 
range of [-1, 1]; where this result is close to -1, shows a strong 
correlation in a reverse direction. If it is close to 1, there is a 
strong correlation in the same direction and, if it is close to 0, 
there is no correlation among these features, where a positive or 
negative sign indicates that these features have the same or 
various tendencies, respectively. The PCC values of features 
are descendingly ranked to select the important features. If there 
are a set of features and their correlation matrix is constructed, 
as shown in Figure 5, the highest correlation feature values 
produce the significant features.  
 
B. EM clustering for identifying SCADA attacks 
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   An EM algorithm [19] is implemented to evaluate the 
maximum likelihood parameters of a statistical model in several 
states, such as the one where the equations cannot be explained 
directly. The EM algorithm repeatedly estimates the unknown 
model parameters with two main phases: the E and M steps.  
 
   Firstly, the E step (i.e., expectation) in which the posterior 
distribution probabilities of the hidden variables are estimated 
using the present model parameter values. After that, the objects 
are slightly allocated to each cluster based on this posterior 
distribution. Secondly, the M step (maximisation) re-evaluates 
the parameters of the model with the maximum likelihood rule 
for estimating the fractional assignment. The EM algorithm is 
guaranteed to catch a local maximum for the model parameters 
estimated. The steps of the EM technique are presented in 
Algorithm 1.   
 
Algorithm 1: the EM algorithm main steps. 
Input: the dataset (x), the total number of clusters (M), the accepted 
error threshold for convergence € and the maximum number of 
iterations 
E-step: calculate the expectation of the whole data log-likelihood. 
 
M-step: choice a new parameter estimate that maximizes the Q-
function. 
 
Iteration: increment ; repeat step 2 and 3 until the 
convergence condition is met. 
Output: a sequence of parameter estimates , which 
represent the success of the convergence criteria. 
C. Architecture of privacy preservation Intrusion Detection 
Technique  
 
    An effective privacy preservation intrusion detection 
technique is proposed for preventing the disclosure of 
sensitive/privacy information and detecting malicious 
observations of SCADA systems. As shown in Figure 3, the 
architecture of this technique consists of four steps that 
demonstrate its ease of application for all SCADA types, in 
particular, power systems that are used in this study.  First and 
foremost, it is an essential step for building privacy and 
intrusion detection mechanisms collecting SCADA data in a 
data source to make it easier while preprocessing and during 
analysis. As SCADA data is collected from different nodes with 
diverse protocols that are incompatible when handled by 
machine learning algorithms, this data has to be processed for 
execution by those algorithms. 
 
   Secondly, selecting portions of important features using the 
PCC technique prevents disclosing private information of 
SCADA. This is because that some features are neglected and 
the most important ones will be used by machine learning 
techniques. Machine learning techniques demand a large 
number of features to be successfully learned and validated, but 
this exposes sensitive information of SCADA systems, so 
adopting small features can address this issue. This can be 
measured using the new term of ‘sensitivity percentage of data 
disclosure’ that means the rate of the feature selected to the 
entire number of features used in a data source.  
 
   Thirdly, we apply the EM technique for clustering normal and 
suspicious instances of SCADA data in order to estimate the 
efficiency of identifying attack activities with a small number 
of features. Finally, the performance evaluation of the proposed 
PPID technique is computed in terms of error detection/false 
positive rate (FPR), sensitivity percentage of data disclosure 
(i.e., feature percentage).  The efficiency of the technique can 
be achieved when these terms are as low as possible, as 
discussed in Section V.   
 
 
Figure 3. Framework of privacy preservation intrusion detection technique 
II. DATASET FOR EVALUATION  
 
   The power system datasets [21] for multiclass attacks are used 
to evaluate the performance of the proposed privacy 
preservation intrusion detection technique and are compared 
with the techniques published in [20]. The multi-class datasets 
include 37 scenarios, are encompassed into natural events (8), 
no events (1) and intrusion events (28). The process of 
establishing this dataset is depicted in Figure 4, which 
demonstrates the main network components used. Firstly, G1 
and G2 are power generators. R1 across R4 are Intelligent 
Electronic Devices (IEDs) that can turn the breakers on or off. 
These breakers are tagged BR1 over BR4. There are two lines: 
line one spans from breaker 1 (BR1) to breaker 2 (BR2) and 
line two spans from breaker 3 (BR3) to breaker 4 (BR4).  
 
    Each IED manages one breaker. R1 controls BR1, R2 
controls BR2, where the IEDs apply a distance protection 
mechanism that trips the breaker on detected faults whether 
actually valid or fake, as they have no internal validation to 
identify the difference. Operators can also manually generate 
instructions to the IEDs R1 over R4 to manually trip the 
breakers BR1 over BR4. The manual override is utilised while 
executing maintenance on the lines or other components. 
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Figure 4. Framework of generating power system datasets [20] 
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Evaluation criteria  
 
    The accuracy, Detection Rate (DR) and False Positive Rate 
(FPR) depend on the four terms true positive (TP), true negative 
(TN), false negative (FN) and false positive (FP). TP denotes 
the number of actual attack records classified as attacks, TN 
refers to the number of actual normal records classified as 
normal, FN is the number of actual attack records classified as 
normal and finally, FP is the number of actual normal records 
classified as attacks. These metrics are defined as follows. 
 The accuracy is defined as the proportion of all normal 
and attack records properly classified, that is, 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃+ 𝑇𝑁+ 𝐹𝑃+𝐹𝑁
    (2) 
 
 The DR is the percentage of precisely detected attack 
records, that is, 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
      (3)  
 
 The FPR identifies the percentage of incorrectly detected 
attack records, that equals, 
 
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 =
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁
      (4) 
B. Feature Description and selection  
 
    In the power system dataset for multiclass attacks, there are 
4 synchrophasors that include 29 features for a total of 116 
PMU measurements. The features taken from each PMU and 
their descriptions are shown in Table I.  
 
   The PCC technique is employed for ranking these features in 
a range of [-1, 1], as depicted in Figure 5.  Each quarter of these 
features is applied in order to evaluate the EM technique. The 
main motive for selecting each portion of these features is to 
prevent sensitive features from disclosure through the IDS 
techniques.   
 
Table I.  Feature description of power system dataset [20] 
 
PA1:VH – PA3:VH Phase A – C Voltage Phase Angle 
PM1:V – PM3:V Phase A – C Voltage Magnitude 
PA4:IH – PA6:IH Phase A – C Current Phase Angle 
PM4:I – PM6:I Phase A – C Current Magnitude 
PA7:VII – PA9:VII Pos. – Neg. – Zero Voltage Phase Angle 
PM7:V – PM9:V Pos. – Neg. – Zero Voltage Magnitude 
PA10:VH – PA12:VH Pos. – Neg. – Zero Current Phase Angle  
PM10:V – PM12:V Pos. – Neg. – Zero Current Magnitude 
F Frequency for relays 
DF Frequency Delta (dF/dt) for relays 
PA:Z Apparent Impedance seen by relays 
PA:ZH Apparent Impedance Angle seen by relays 
S Status Flag for relays 
 
 
Figure 5. Ranked features using PCC technique 
 
C. Evaluation using EM technique  
 
     The performance evaluation of the EM was conducted in 
each quarter of these features, revealing the overall DR, 
accuracy and FPR values demonstrated in Table II. Figure 6 
displays the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, 
which represents the correlation between the DRs and FPRs for 
the selected features.  
 
Table II.  Evaluation of features selection using EM technique 
Feature 
percentage 
DR Accuracy FPR 
25% 66.4% 70.6% 32.5% 
50% 75.6% 76.3% 25.1% 
75% 82.8% 83.5% 17.8% 
100% 88.9% 90.2% 11.7% 
 
   It can be observed that the gradual increase of the feature 
percentages improved the DR and accuracy, whilst dropping the 
FPR. The DR and accuracy improved from 66.4% to 88.9% and 
70.6% and 90.2%, respectively, but the FPR decreased from 
32.4% to 11.7%. This reveals that the use of all of the features 
significantly improves detecting SCADA attacks, however 
keeping sensitive information secure requires intelligent 
techniques for detecting malicious events of SCADA systems 
while using a small number of features, which contains private 
information.  
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Figure 6. ROC curves of EM technique for feature percentages 
D. Comparison with three techniques 
    The results of our technique are compared with the three 
techniques of Nearest Neighbour, Naïve Bayes, Random 
Forests published in [20].  As demonstrated in Table III, our 
technique achieves superiority in terms of DR and FPR 
compared with these techniques, with the 75% of features.  
 
Table III. Performance comparisons of techniques  
Technique DR FPR 
Nearest Neighbour [20] 55.3% 44.8% 
Naïve Bayes [20] 44.4% 52.6% 
Random Forests [20] 60.5% 38.4% 
Our technique 88.9% 11.7 % 
 
     Our technique accomplishes better results than the three 
other techniques, as it clusters normal and abnormal data based 
on the exact estimation of mean and standard deviation of 
normal and attack classes, making a clear difference between 
them. However, the technique is not able to detect the best 
results with a lower number of features because of the relative 
similarity between normal and attack data. This can be achieved 
by using hierarchical clustering techniques to use a small 
number of features, resulting in disclosing sensitive information 
of SCADA systems.    
IV. CONCLUSION  
   This study produces a novel privacy preservation intrusion 
detection mechanism using the correlation coefficient EM 
clustering techniques. Important features are selected based on 
the correlation coefficient technique to select portions of 
SCADA data with less sensitive information.  Then, the EM 
clustering technique groups SCADA data in order to effectively 
and efficiently detect abnormal activities.  The performance 
evaluation of this mechanism is compared with three peer 
techniques using the power system dataset for multiclass 
attacks, with the superiority of the proposed mechanism for 
detecting SCADA attacks. The experimental results reveal 
reducing the number of features that prevent disclosing 
sensitive information slightly decreases the detection rate of 
attacks. In future, we will use advanced clustering techniques 
that significantly improve the detection accuracy.   
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